Muslim brotherhood and Hidden Approaches

التالى السابق

The Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen (Islah): Between Religious Slogans and Exclusionary Practices

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South Eye | Report

The Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing in Yemen, the Islah Party, presents one of the most complex and contentious forces operating in the region. Despite publicly portraying themselves as moderate and reform-oriented, evidence suggests that their actions have often diverged significantly from their declared goals. In particular, their expansionist agenda, ideological rigidity, and opportunistic use of religion have generated increasing public distrust—especially in the south of Yemen.

The Brotherhood’s ideological foundation is based on the politicization of Islam and a transnational vision that sees the state as a tool for religious hegemony. This vision, influenced by the works of figures like Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, has not evolved to suit local contexts, particularly in South Yemen, where society traditionally leaned towards civil and inclusive norms with limited religious politicization. Following the 1990 unification of Yemen, southern society witnessed an unprecedented influx of religious institutions, charities, universities, and centers controlled by the Brotherhood—most of which were supported by extensive foreign funding.

This expansion has not been benign. Numerous reports from regional and international institutions have documented the Brotherhood’s ties to extremist networks, including the use of charities and educational platforms to indoctrinate youth with ideological narratives hostile to diversity and modernity. According to studies by the Carnegie Endowment and statements from the U.S. State Department, the Brotherhood has shown pragmatism when engaging with international powers, yet on the ground, it fosters a culture of exclusion and hostility, particularly toward secular, southern people, and minority voices.

In practice, the Brotherhood in Yemen has undermined state institutions by infiltrating government apparatuses through loyalists in ministries, security bodies, and diplomatic positions. Many of these individuals have been accused of redirecting public resources and obstructing reforms to maintain the Brotherhood's influence. In provinces like Marib and Taiz, civilian and civil trends have been systematically marginalized, with the Brotherhood setting boundaries for cultural and intellectual expression.

Their cooperation with other radical actors further complicates their image. Secret documents and investigative reports—including some published by the Sanaa Center and regional sources—have pointed to tacit understandings and practical cooperation between Brotherhood networks and the Houthi movement. Although the two sides differ ideologically, their temporary tactical alignment against common rivals has led to de facto alliances that serve Iranian regional interests. This has raised concerns that the Brotherhood, by facilitating certain Houthi activities, indirectly contributes to the destabilization of the region and undermines South, Gulf and international security priorities.

What makes the Brotherhood more dangerous than other hardline currents, such as traditional Salafi groups, is its ability to disguise its long-term agenda. While Salafis often avoid politics and focus on doctrinal purity, the Brotherhood adopts a flexible rhetoric that can accommodate secular slogans and democratic language when beneficial, only to revert to a monopolistic, ideological mode when power becomes accessible. This duality has allowed them to operate in gray zones, evading international scrutiny and manipulating donor agendas.

Even within U.S. policy, there have been contradictions. While Washington promotes civil values, it has, at times, maintained communication channels with Brotherhood affiliates, mistakenly viewing them as a moderate Islamic alternative. However, the Brotherhood's track record—both in Yemen and in other Arab contexts—proves otherwise. Their governance experiments, such as in Egypt and parts of Libya, have been marked by ideological rigidity, exclusion of rivals, suppression of freedoms, and a deep state-building strategy that prioritizes loyalty over competence.

In the South of Yemen context, the Brotherhood’s northern roots and their agenda of centralization clash with the aspirations of southern populations, who seek autonomy, inclusivity, and an end to ideological domination. Local experiences with the Brotherhood, particularly through the Islah Party, have reinforced the view that their religious discourse masks a political project aimed at monopolizing power.

Civilians, intellectuals, and independent activists have increasingly warned against the Brotherhood’s entrenchment in government, arguing that their presence is a key factor behind the dysfunction, corruption, and instability in Aden and other southern governorates. Public campaigns have been launched on social media and in public forums, calling for the removal of Brotherhood-affiliated officials from state institutions and an end to the manipulation of ideology for political gains.

In sum, the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen represents a multi-dimensional threat. Their misuse of religion, alliances with radical actors, inconsistent behavior with international standards, and systemic efforts to dominate state structures make them unfit partners in building a secure and stable region. Any sustainable peace process must include mechanisms to curtail their influence, restore institutional neutrality, and uphold the right of all communities to self-determination free from ideological coercion, especially in the context of Southern people.