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Southern Transitional Council: Houthi blackmail threatens the chances of peace

Analytics - 2 month ago

South Eye| Aden

Salem Thabet Al-Awlaki, the spokesperson for the Southern Transitional Council, stated that the international community's ongoing engagement with the extortion practices of the Houthi militia, both locally and internationally, "will not achieve the desired peace in Yemen."

In an interview with "Erem News," Al-Awlaki emphasized that a skewed political equation in negotiations will result in "bad peace that serves the Houthi militia and its backers in Iran." He warned that without political, military, and economic deterrents, the situation will revert to the Stockholm Agreement, from which the Houthis gained advantages while refusing to meet their obligations.

Al-Awlaki noted that the relationship between the Southern Transitional Council and the Yemeni presidency and government, recognized internationally, is based on the "Riyadh Agreement" and the power transfer declaration. He stressed that working outside of these frameworks or attempting to unilaterally decide on matters without the Presidential Leadership Council or bypassing the southern issue will not lead to a stable or positive relationship.

The detailed interview with the spokesperson of the Southern Transitional Council sheds light on various local issues related to the war on terrorism in the southern provinces, developments in the political process in the country amid ongoing Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea, and other complex aspects of the Yemeni crisis.

How has the Southern Transitional Council evolved since its formation over seven years ago?

In the early years of the Southern Transitional Council, the focus was on building its structures, including the presidency, the general secretariat, the national assembly, and local leadership in the provinces. Gradually, the council gained a more prominent political presence through its role in the government and the Presidential Leadership Council.

Over the years, the council has also worked on developing and equipping the southern security forces and military capabilities. Its political and external relations efforts have become more effective. The conditions today are different from those of 7 or 8 years ago, and the Southern Transitional Council is adapting to these changes by renewing its structures, tools, and performance.

Some argue that the Southern Transitional Council has lost some of its popular appeal compared to its early years. What is your response to this, and what do you think has led to this shift in perspective?

The Southern Transitional Council is part of a broader political, economic, security, and military landscape. It succeeds in some areas and falls short in others, as the saying goes, "The only one who does not make mistakes is the one who does not work."

Several years ago, the council was not a partner in the government or the Presidential Leadership Council. Today, it is a partner in both, and the southern public perceives it as involved in all aspects of the political scene, both positive and negative.

There are differing opinions on this matter, but the council is part of the ongoing interactions and the political, military, and security movements in the country. Any criticism is viewed as constructive, stemming from concern and the broad public support for the council. We understand and appreciate this feedback and continually strive to address all emerging issues, be it political, military, or related to the southern cause and its trajectory in the peace procطhat is the nature of the relationship between the Southern Transitional Council and the Yemeni presidency and legitimate government?

The relationship between the Southern Transitional Council and the Presidential Leadership Council and the government is based on the Riyadh Agreement of November 2019 and the power transfer declaration of April 2022. These are the governing references for the council's relationship with the government and the Presidential Leadership Council.

Adhering to these agreements and declarations ensures a stable and positive relationship. Any attempts to operate outside these frameworks or to unilaterally decide on matters without consulting the Presidential Leadership Council or manipulating the southern issue will not foster a good or stable relationship.

Recently, Al-Qaeda has returned to using its previous tactics for executing terrorist operations. Why at this particular time?

First, I want to emphasize that the war is not over and is evolving with different tactics. They seek political gains but do not want to make commitments, while simultaneously aligning with terrorist organizations in the south.

All indicators point to field support and the supply of weapons, including drones, to these organizations through the Houthi militia to destabilize the southern provinces. This strategy aims to disrupt the security situation amid ongoing developments in the field and the Red Sea.

Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have allied with various groups over the past three decades, starting with their return from Afghanistan and their involvement in the 1994 war in the south. They have been used as political tools throughout the years, with support from the Iranian axis and the Houthi militia.

It has been two years since the Southern Armed Forces launched the "East Arrows" campaign to clear Abyan and Shabwa from terrorist elements. Although it achieved strategic victories, why has it not been able to fully eradicate them like in Aden and Hadramaut?

The war on terrorism is complex, involving many interests. Support from the Houthi militia has been evident. Significant successes have been achieved in Shabwa and other provinces. The ongoing battle involves mountainous areas and valleys near Al-Bayda and Marib, with continued attempts by terrorists to carry out attacks.

The southern forces' presence in the field has grown, and security has improved in the southern provinces compared to previous years. However, achieving greater results requires regional and international efforts  support, train, and develop these forces continuously.

Is the geographical nature of Abyan and Shabwa different from that of Mukalla and Aden?

Yes, indeed. Additionally, we are in a phase of political transformation where all political tools are used. These organizations have been utilized politically in various ways over the past three decades. The success of the "East Arrows" campaign was not limited to Abyan but also impacted security in Aden, Lahj, and surrounding areas.

What are the latest developments regarding political understandings and the peace roadmap with the Houthis? Where does the Southern Transitional Council stand in this process?

The roadmap for peace is designed in several stages: confidence-building, political negotiations, and the transitional phase. Following the power transfer announcement, the first stage involved confidence-building measures, including opening ports and airports and granting some concessions to the Houthis.

The Southern Transitional Council, through its role in the Presidential Leadership Council, is part of this process. However, we stress that the Houthis should not be rewarded with another bad peace deal like the Stockholm Agreement, which only benefits them and Iran, especially with the current escalation in the region and the Red Sea.

Recent days have seen Houthi escalation on several fronts, including an attempted attack on the Safir facility in Marib. Does this undermine any progress in political movements?

Certainly, this reflects the nature of the Houthi militia, which seeks gains through military operations while pretending to seek peace. Such actions undermine any political progress and pose a significant threat. The Houthis do not seek genuine peace but rather political and economic gains under humanitarian pretexts.

How do you view the United Nations' and its envoy's handling of the Houthi issue?

Generally, there is extortion by the Houthis, and this extortion is being engaged with by the UN and others. This extortion must end. Good peace is achieved through balance and an even negotiating table, while bad peace results from a flawed political equation. The ongoing engagement with Houthi extortion will not achieve the peace envisioned by some.

Has the Yemeni file dropped in priority on the international and UN agendas?

With numerous global events, including the Ukraine-Russia war, the Yemeni file may not receive the same level of attention as before. However, there is clear regional and international interest in achieving peace and ending the war. It is crucial that peace efforts address the issue comprehensively and do not solely benefit the Houthis.

What are your thoughts on Israel's attack on the Hodeidah port and the targeting of fuel tanks? When do you expect the Houthis to respond as they have threatened?

The root problem lies with the Houthi militias, and blaming others does not address this. The crimes committed by the Houthis are as severe as those in Gaza. These actions are driven by the Iranian axis and aim to expand its influence in the region, with the Houthis acting as an Iranian tool.

The Houthis continue to target international shipping and escalate their operations. Where is the "Prosperity Coalition," and why has the world's strongest military not managed to limit the Houthis' capabilities?

Many believe that the international coalition "Guardians of Prosperity" has not achieved the desired results in addressing Houthi piracy. A more robust international response is needed to curtail the Houthis' military and technological capabilities. Without a comprehensive approach involving political, economic, and military measures, their aggression will continue.