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Stability in South and Yemen Amid the International Miscalculations

Analytics - منذ 5 ساعات

South Eye | Report

The Yemeni conflict has long been complicated by international miscalculations and deliberate blindness to critical threats. Nowhere is this more evident than in the persistent refusal by the United Nations and several Western actors to acknowledge the dangerous roles played by embedded actors within the so-called “Internationally Recognized Government” — particularly figures like Amjad Khaled, a former Transport Brigade commander who has been credibly accused of coordinating operations between Al-Qaeda elements and the Houthi movement. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which its security forces administers most of South Yemen and fields the most reliable and capable forces fighting against the Houthis militias, had warned of this threat over three years ago. Yet those warnings were ignored. This omission has not only hindered the broader fight against extremism but has also severely damaged Southern and Yemenis’ trust in the institutions supposedly working on their behalf.

This is not an isolated misstep. Similar failures were evident in Somalia, where the United States and United Nations avoided acknowledging that certain “partner” factions had deep and proven links with Al-Shabab, a terrorist organization. By repeating this approach in Yemen, international stakeholders are effectively embedding destabilizing actors within what is supposed to be a legitimate governmental structure. They continue to promote the illusion that inclusion will lead to unity — but in reality, inclusion without vetting or accountability only emboldens those who sabotage the system from within.

One of the clearest examples of this is the Muslim Brotherhood’s Yemeni branch, known as the Islah Party. For years, Islah has operated as a hybrid political-militant organization that blurs the lines between governance and armed subversion. It maintains ideological loyalty to the transnational Muslim Brotherhood network, which has been designated as a terrorist organization by governments such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. The United States has already classified several Brotherhood-affiliated groups — including Hamas, Hasm, and Liwa al-Thawra — as terrorist entities. The ideological and operational threads connecting these organizations are neither speculative nor incidental; they are rooted in common doctrine, funding channels, and strategic goals.

In Yemen, Islah has used its access to state institutions to shield and sustain extremist elements. While presenting itself as a political party, it has been involved in a range of illicit activities that undermine national security. Investigations and reports have revealed that Islah-aligned military leaders have seized and redirected billions of Yemeni riyals from state revenues — including approximately 1.849 billion from qat sales tax and 600 million monthly from fuel and gas levies — without remitting them to the Central Bank. These massive financial diversions support not only corruption but also extremist agendas.

Furthermore, evidence shows a nexus between Islah and the Houthi militia in the smuggling of drugs and weapons. This alliance of convenience reflects not ideological unity but rather shared goals in destabilizing the south and undermining efforts to restore order. The smuggling routes used to move arms and narcotics through Yemen serve both groups, creating a shadow economy that funds their respective militias while destroying the economic and social fabric of the region.

More alarmingly, there have been reports of clandestine workshops in northern-controlled areas manufacturing drones and rockets under the pretense of “resistance operations.” These facilities are tied to networks historically linked with the Brotherhood and its military proxies. Such operations are reminiscent of patterns seen in other Brotherhood-linked movements, where civilian infrastructure is co-opted for militant objectives.

Jordan offers a recent and relevant case study. In April 2025, the Jordanian government officially banned the Muslim Brotherhood, citing a series of terrorist plots uncovered by security forces, including plans to manufacture missiles and carry out attacks. Authorities exposed how Brotherhood operatives used mosques and media platforms to radicalize youth, built parallel financial systems to hide funds, and recruited students through paramilitary camps. These findings are not speculative; they are backed by arrests, confiscated weapons, and intelligence from regional allies. The parallels with the Islah Party in Yemen are stark and undeniable.

Despite all of this, international actors have hesitated to formally classify the Muslim Brotherhood’s Yemeni branch as a threat. This reluctance persists even as the Brotherhood’s destabilizing fingerprints are visible across regional conflicts. It is this very inconsistency — the willingness to name and confront terrorist-linked movements in some countries, while shielding their affiliates in others — that perpetuates instability.

In contrast, the Southern Transitional Council and its affiliated security forces have consistently aligned themselves with anti-extremist objectives. Southern Forces have played a decisive role in counterterrorism operations across Abyan, Shabwa, and other provinces. They have dismantled Al-Qaeda cells, seized smuggling routes, and worked to secure key ports and borders. Their efforts are not only crucial to the South but also contribute to regional and international maritime security. The STC, unlike Islah, has no ideological or logistical links to extremist networks and has openly embraced cooperation with the international community on security and stabilization efforts based on popular southern national project.

Moreover, South Yemen’s historical and cultural resistance to religiously motivated political movements makes it a uniquely strategic partner in the fight against political Islam groups. The former socialist republic maintained strict secular governance, rejecting attempts by ideological groups to infiltrate public institutions. That legacy endures today, as southern political movements continue to resist theocratic and totalitarian ideologies, prioritizing local governance, civil rights, and national sovereignty.

If Washington is sincere in its regional counterterrorism objectives — including its ongoing debate in Congress over designating the Muslim Brotherhood a foreign terrorist organization — then it must recognize that dismantling the Islah Party in Yemen is not just a southern interest; it is a regional security imperative. Supporting the South in its efforts to neutralize the Brotherhood’s influence is not a matter of favoritism but of sound strategic alignment. Unity cannot be forged on the foundation of duplicity. Peace cannot emerge while extremist actors remain protected by layers of political compromise.

Washington must stop treating South Yemen as a footnote in post-war negotiations and start acknowledging it as a frontline ally in the broader struggle against political Islamism and transnational extremism. Ending Islah’s influence and empowering Southern institutions are a reliable investment on the long term stability.